Equal Protection (tests to gauge)

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, (Iowa 2009).  The foundational principle of equal protection is expressed in Article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution, which provides: “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” See also Iowa Const. art. I, § 1 (“All men and women are, by nature, free and equal . . . .”); id. Art. I, § 2 (recognizing “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people” and “[g]overnment is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people”). Like the Federal Equal Protection Clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Iowa’s constitutional promise of equal protection “ ‘is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’ ”6 Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2004) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1985)).

The constitutional guarantee of equal protection, however, demands certain types of statutory classifications must be subjected to closer scrutiny by courts. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 799 (1982) (“[W]e would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classification.”). Thus, courts apply a heightened level of scrutiny under equal protection analysis when reasons exist to suspect “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4, 58 S. Ct. 778, 783 n.4, 82 L. Ed. 1234, 1242 n.4 (1938). Under this approach, classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin and those affecting fundamental rights are evaluated according to a standard known as “strict scrutiny.” Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 1998). Classifications subject to strict scrutiny are presumptively invalid and must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. In Re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Iowa 2004).

Strict scrutiny is applied to regulations that affect groups that fall under a “suspect classification.” To be considered a suspect classification in the United States, the statute at issue must target: 1) a “discrete” or “insular” minority who, 2) possess an immutable trait, 3) share a history of discrimination, and 4) are powerless to protect themselves via the political process.

Any statutory scheme which commands dissimilar treatment for people who are similarly situated involves the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.Ct. 1746; 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

While a state has broad power when it comes to making classifications, it may not draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination against a particular class. See Levy v. Louisiana , 88 S.Ct. 1509, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).